


Joint Authorities for Rulemaking of Unmanned Systems



13 without JARUS's permission.

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1. How to use Annex B

- 22 The following table provides the basic principles to consider when using SORA Annex B.
- 23

	Principle description	Additional information
#1	Annex B provides assessment criteria for the integrity (i.e. safety gain) and assurance (i.e. method of proof) of the applicant's proposed mitigations. The proposed mitigations are intended to reduce the intrinsic Ground Risk Class (GRC) associated with a given operation.	The identification and implementation of mitigations is the responsibility of the applicant.
#2	Annex B does not cover the Level of Involvement (LoI) of the Competent Authority. LoI is based on the Competent Authority assessment of the applicant's ability to perform the given operation.	Some JARUS groups might provide criteria for level of involvement for use by the Competent Authorities.
#3	A proposed mitigation may or may not have a positive effect on reducing the ground risk associated with a given operation. In the case where a mitigation is available but does not reduce the risk on the ground, its level of integrity should be considered equivalent to "None".	OTSULI
#4	To achieve a given level of integrity/assurance, when more than one criterion exists for that level of integrity/assurance, all applicable criteria need to be met.	
#5	Annex B intentionally uses non- prescriptive terms (e.g. suitable, reasonably practicable) to provide flexibility to both the applicant and the Competent Authorities. This does not constrain the applicant in proposing mitigations, nor the Competent Authority in evaluating what is needed on a case by case basis.	
#6 🔨	This Annex in its entirety also applies to single-person organizations.	
#7	Annex B mitigations are applied to the Operational volume and Ground risk buffer.	
#8	All bullet points within all tables in this Annex are meant to be fulfilled unless followed by OR.	In case a table includes AND/OR in the Integrity criteria this means that a combination of different methods may be used to meet the required total level of performance.

24

25 2. M1(A) – Strategic mitigations for ground risk

M1(A) mitigations are "strategic mitigations" intended to <u>reduce the number of people at risk on the</u> ground. Because of their strategic nature, these mitigations are applied pre-flight during the planning phase. To assess integrity levels of M1 mitigations the following needs to be considered:

- Population density overflown,
- Evaluation of people at risk.

Improvements in static data population density maps are not part of M1(A) mitigation, but should be already used in the intrinsic ground risk assessment at Step #2. Use of best possible data is encouraged but it should be used already for the iGRC determination.

34

An authority may accept time exposure arguments for ground risk reduction, but should understand how
 this affects the cumulative risk. Annex F chapter "Short Exposure Flight Over Higher Population
 Segments" has additional information on the matter.

38

The criteria to assess the level of integrity and level of assurance of M1(A) type ground risk mitigations are provided respectively in Tables 2 and 3.

		L	EVEL of INTEGRITY	Y.
		Low	Medium	High
M1(A) – Strategic Mitigations for Ground Risk	Criterion #1 (Evaluation of people at risk)	which people are • it is reasonable	ions to justify lowering the ea during daytime wher rial area at night time population density map iseline in Step #2. a reduction, due to a st: t is not expected to per sheltered ¹ , to consider that mo e located under a struct ering is achieved for o vhile avoiding flights new re. of dynamic density da e provider) relevant for to substantiate a lower te real time or historic	ta (e.g. data from UTM the proposed area and data or dasymetric
	Comments	section "4.12. Sti 103 to 111, or - MITRE presentat		y Evaluation A4 report Sheltering (KU)", pages AS Technical Analysis

	 EXCOM Science and Research Panel (SARP) 2016 TAAC Update' - PR 16-3979 In general, it can be expected that UAS weighing less than 25kg are not able to penetrate into buildings except in rare cases where the UAS speed or building materials are unusual (tents, glass roofs, etc). In cases where a UAS is still able to penetrate a structure, sheltering may not be perfect, but can still offer an amount of mitigation. ² The consideration of this mitigation may vary based on local conditions. A metastudy of time-activity pattern studies shows that people generally spend less than 10% of their time outside. Diffey, B. (2010). An overview analysis of the time people spend outdoors. The British journal of dermatology. 164. 848-54. 10.1111/j.1365-2133.2010.10165.x. 			
Criterion #2 (Impact on at risk population)	The at-risk population is lowered by at least 1 iGRC population band (~90%) using one or more methods described in the Level of Integrity for Criterion #1 above.	The at-risk population is lowered by at least 2 iGRC population bands (~99%) using one or more methods described in the Level of Integrity for Criterion #1 above.	The at-risk population is be lowered by at least 3 iGRC population bands (~99.9%) using one or more methods described in the Level of Integrity for Criterion #1 above.	
Comments	N/A	N/A	N/A	

41

 Table 2 - Level of Integrity Assessment Criteria for Ground Risk M1(A) Mitigations

42

		Low	Medium	High		
	Criterion #1 (Evaluation	All mapping products, data the density of population a authority.				
M1(A) –	of people at risk)	N/A				
Strategic Mitigations for Ground Risk	Criterion #2 (Impact on at risk population)	The applicant has support required level of integrity typically done by means simulation, inspection, de operational experience.	y is achieved. This is s of testing, analysis,	A competent third party validates the claimed level of integrity.		
	Comments	Quantitative and qualitati target reductions of at ri integrity levels.				

43

Table 3 – Level of Assurance Assessment Criteria for Ground Risk M1(A) Mitigations

44 3. M1(B) – Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) - avoid flying over people

M1(B) mitigation is a tactical mitigation where the remote pilot has good visibility around him to the surrounding ground areas and the pilot is avoiding flying above any people. Assuming good visibility on the ground for the operational volume, it is expected that most VLOS operations can achieve Low robustness for M1(B) mitigation.

49

		Low
M1(B) - Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) - avoid flying over people	Criterion 1	 The operation is performed within Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) of the remote pilot. While operating the drone, the remote pilot can safely and unambiguously identify area(s) of less risk on the ground. The remote pilot is able to safely reduce the number of people at risk by: Flying at a safe distance¹ from non-active participants OR; In an abnormal situation: being still able to command or manoeuvre the drone to a less populated area; OR having the ability to alert or notify people near the drone to get to safety.
	Comments	¹ As defined by the competent authority or at least using a horizontal distance derived from a 1:1 principle

50

Table 4 - Level of Integrity Assessment Criteria for Ground Risk M1(B) Mitigations

M1(B) -					
Visual Line of Sight		Low			
(VLOS) - avoid flying	Criterion 1	The operational procedures for the mitigation are documented, including the safe distance from non-active participants (when applicable).			
over people	Comments	N/A			

51

 Table 5- Level of Assurance Assessment Criteria for Ground Risk M1(B) Mitigations

52 4. M2 – Effects of ground impact are reduced

53 M2 Mitigations are intended to <u>reduce the effect of ground impact</u> once the control of the operation is 54 lost. This is done by either reducing the probability of lethality of a UA impact (i.e. energy, impulse, 55 transfer energy dynamics, etc.) and/or reducing the size of the expected critical area*. Examples include, 56 but are not limited to: parachutes, autorotation, frangibility, stalling the aircraft to slow the descent and 57 increase the impact angle.

The base assumption in SORA for UAS impact lethality before M2 mitigation is applied is that all impacts are lethal and the critical areas for impacts correspond to the following table. An applicant should demonstrate a required total amount of reduction in either or both of these factors. Depending on whether the mitigation is passive, manually activated or automatically activated the applicant must produce correspondingly adequate evidence and procedures for a given level of robustness. Reduction of the inherent critical area of a UA by way of analysis should be conducted already in Step #2 of SORA.

65

58

* Critical area calculations are defined in Annex F. The SORA Main Body assumes the following critical
 areas for each characteristic dimension:

~	'
6	8

Critical area (m ²) 8 135 1,35	13,500	135,000

69

70 Applicants arguing for a mitigation by reduction of critical area shall use the values above as the baseline

of comparison to show the appropriate mitigation. If an applicant has used a different critical area via

the modifications in Annex F for their UAS then that value should be used as the baseline against which

73 the mitigation is assessed.

				Y
	_	None	Medium	High / High+
M2 - Effects of UA impact dynamics are reduced	Criterion #1 (Technical design)	N/A	 Effects of impact dynamics and immediate post impact hazards¹, critical area or the combination of these results are reduced such that the risk to population is reduced by an approximate 1 order of magnitude (90%)². When applicable, in case of malfunctions, failures or any combinations thereof that may lead to a crash, the UAS contains all elements required for the activation of the mitigation. 	 High Same as Medium. In addition: When applicable, the activation of the mitigation is automated³. The effects of impact dynamics and immediate post impact hazards¹, critical area or the combination of them are reduced such that the risk to the population is reduced by an approximate 2 orders of magnitude (99%)².

			• When applicable, any failure or malfunction of the proposed mitigation itself (e.g. inadvertent activation) does not adversely affect the safety of the operation. ³	 High+ Same as above. In addition: The effects of impact dynamics and immediate post impact hazards¹, critical area or the combination of them are reduced such that the risk to the population is reduced by an approximate 3 orders of magnitude (99.9%)². 		
	Comments	of high energ ² Latest res Abbreviated b and test dum probability of fatalities. It de beyond which Further Guida be found for from Unman ASSURE UA Evaluation. ³ Failures or r	f immediate post impact hazards y parts. search on UAS impacts esti- Injury Scale (AIS) developed for mies. An injury of AIS level 3 is death. Note that the SORA me oes not provide guidance on the n an injury should be considered ance on how to evaluate impact s example in Ranges of Injury Ris ned Aircraft Systems DOI: 10. S reports A14 and A4 on UAS malfunctions of the UAS or mitiga afe functioning of either system	mate injuries using the r automotive impact tests estimated to have a 10% ethodology only considers e injury levels / thresholds as a fatality. severity measurement may sk Associated with Impact 1007/s10439-017-1921-6, Ground Collision Severity ation means should not		
		N/A	N/A	⁴ The applicant retains the discretion to implement an additional manual activation function.		
	Criterion #2 (Procedures, if applicable)		nt used to reduce the effect of th maintained in accordance with r			
÷ C	Comments	⁵ The distinction between a low, a medium and a high level of robustness for this criterion is achieved through the level of assurance (Table 7 below).				
Y	Criterion #3 (Training, if applicable)	training must If personnel mitigation me	the mitigation requires action fr be provided for the remote crew responsible for the installation easures are internal to the opera- tified and provided training by the	by the operator. and maintenance of the ator, then these personnel		
	Comments		on between a low, a medium and ion is achieved through the lev			

Table 6 - Level of Integrity Assessment Criteria for M2 Mitigations

			LEVEL of ASSURANC	CE
		Low	Medium	High / High+
	Criterion #1 (Technical design)	N/A	The applicant has supporting evidence to claim the required level of integrity and reliability is achieved ¹ . This is typically done by means of testing, analysis, simulation ² , inspection, design review or through operational experience.	The claimed level of integrity is validated by a competent third party against a standard considered adequate by the competent authority and/or in accordance with means of compliance acceptable to that authority ³ (when applicable).
M2 - Effects of UA impact dynamics are reduced	Comments	N/A	¹ The use of Industry standards is encouraged when developing mitigations used to reduce the effect of ground impact. ² When a simulation is used, the validity of the targeted environment used in the simulation needs to be justified.	³ National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) may define the standards and/or the means of compliance they consider adequate. The SORA Annex B will be updated at a later point in time with a list of adequate standards based on the feedback provided by the NAAs.
	Criterion #2 (Procedures, if applicable)	N/A FFR	 Procedures are validated against standards considered adequate by the competent authority and/or in accordance with means of compliance acceptable to that authority⁴. The adequacy of the procedures is proved through: Dedicated flight tests, or Simulation, provided that the representativeness of the simulation means is proven for the intended purpose with positive results. 	 Same as Medium. In addition: Flight tests performed to validate the procedures cover the complete flight envelope or are proven to be conservative. The procedures, flight tests and simulations are validated by a competent third party.

1

	Comments Criterion #3 (Training, if applicable)	the means of co will be updated	 fon Authorities (NAAs) may dependent of the provided by the NAAs Training syllabus is available. The Operator provides competency-based, theoretical and practical training. 	uate. The SORA Annex B list of adequate standards
	Comments	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Table 7 - Level of Assurance Assessment Criteria for M2 Mitigations			
ţĊ	RE	FR		

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Table 7 - Level of Assurance Assessment Criteria for M2 Mitigations